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The looming expiration of the federal No
Child Left Behind Act has prompted a flood of
commission reports, studies, and punditry.
Virtually all of those analyses have assumed that
the law should and will be reauthorized, dis-
agreeing only over how it should be revised. They
have accepted the law’s premises without argu-
ment: that government-imposed standards and
bureaucratic “accountability” are effective mech-
anisms for improving American education and
that Congress should be involved in their imple-
mentation.
In this paper, we put those preconceptions
under a microscope and subject NCLB to a thor-
ough review. We explore its effectiveness to date
and ask whether its core principles are sound. We
find that No Child Left Behind has been ineffective
in achieving its intended goals, has had negative
unintended consequences, is incompatible with
policies that do work, is at the mercy of a political
process that can only worsen its prospects, and is
based on premises that are fundamentally flawed.
We further conclude that NCLB oversteps the fed-
eral government’s constitutional limits—treading
on a responsibility that, by law and tradition, is
reserved to the states and the people. We therefore
recommend that NCLB not be reauthorized and
that the federal government return to its constitu-
tional bounds by ending its involvement in ele-
mentary and secondary education.
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Introduction
Virtually every study that has weighed in
on the future of the No Child Left Behind Act
has taken the law’s underlying principles as
given.1 The voluminous Beyond NCLB: Fulfilling
the Promise to Our Nation’s Children report from
the Aspen Institute’s Commission on No
Child Left Behind is typical, declaring that
“Commission members . . . were united from
the outset in [their] firm commitment to . . . har-
ness the power of standards, accountability
and increased student options.”2 Commission
members’ commitment to government stan-
dards and testing was not a product of their
study but a foregone conclusion.
Similarly, the “ESEA Reauthorization
Policy Statement” published by the Council of
Chief State School Officers promises that “if
we follow through,” standards-based reform
“has the potential to dramatically improve
student achievement and meet our education
goals.”3 No defense of, or evidence supporting,
this claim is included in the statement.
Despite the widespread assumption that
government standards and accountability
will prove effective, it is unwise to make poli-
cy decisions affecting tens of millions of chil-
dren—and costing tens of billions of dollars—
on the basis of preconceived, unscrutinized
notions. This paper seeks to provide a more
rational and empirical basis for the NCLB
reauthorization debate by
• reviewing the law’s performance to date,
• exploring how politics affected its design, 
• reviewing the most high-profile recom-
mendations for revisions to the law,
• exploring Congress’s traditional and
constitutional role in education, and
• discussing the merits of alternative
reform strategies.
Assessing NCLB
NCLB’s supporters began declaring the law
a success within a few years of its January 2002
passage. In July 2005, for instance, when the
National Assessment of Educational Progress
released its most recent Trends in Academic
Progress report, then-chairman of the House
Committee on Education and the Workforce
John Boehner (R-OH) asserted that
[t]hrough No Child Left Behind, we
made it a national priority to improve
student achievement and close achieve-
ment gaps that have persisted between
disadvantaged students and their peers.
The culture of accountability is taking
root in our nation’s schools, and stu-
dent achievement is on the rise.4
In January 2006, Secretary of Education
Margaret Spellings was similarly effusive:
I am pleased to report that No Child
Left Behind is working. The long-term
Nation’s Report Card results released
this past summer showed elementary
school student math and reading
achievement at an all-time high and
the achievement gap closing.5
This sort of triumphalism has continued
ever since, with Secretary Spellings in May
2007 even giving NCLB credit for improving
scores on NAEP U.S. history and civics exams,
despite the fact that NCLB does not address
those subjects: 
For the past five years, No Child Left
Behind (NCLB) has focused attention
and support on helping students be-
come stronger readers. The release
today by The Nation’s Report Card on
U.S. History and Civics proves NCLB is
working and preparing our children to
succeed.6
Policymakers like Boehner and Spellings
who helped to craft and pass NCLB are not
the only ones who have touted the law’s sup-
posed success. In its final report, released in
February 2007, the Aspen Institute’s NCLB
commission rang a similarly positive note,
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claiming that
[t]here is growing evidence that NCLB
is producing . . . improved student a-
chievement. According to NAEP, scores
in mathematics increased nationwide
for 4th and 8th graders from 2003 to
2005. . . . In reading, the national aver-
age of 4th graders’ scores improved
from 2003 to 2005.7
Consider, however, that NCLB was passed
in January 2002, and 4th-grade reading scores
did not in fact change at all between 2002 and
2005. The one-point uptick between 2003 and
2005 only offset a one-point downtick be-
tween 2002 and 2003. Furthermore, the Aspen
commission neglects to mention that 8th-
grade reading scores fell by two points after
2002. At least according to NAEP scores since
NCLB’s passage, it seems that the law has
achieved nothing of consequence.
But postpassage scores don’t tell us the
whole story. To judge whether the law is work-
ing, we also have to look at preexisting trends
in achievement. It is quite possible, for exam-
ple, that math scores were already rising, and
reading scores stagnating or falling, before the
law was passed and that NCLB affected nei-
ther. To have any hope of isolating NCLB’s
actual effect on student achievement and test
score gaps, we have to compare score trends
before and after the law’s passage.
According to the NAEP Long-Term Trends
report, 4th- and 8th-grade math scores did
improve between 1999 and 2004, as did 4th-
grade reading scores (8th-grade reading was
flat). Attributing those results to NCLB is
highly problematic, however, given that the law
was only enacted in January 2002 and not fully
implemented until the 2005–06 school year.
But suppose NCLB really did start trans-
forming American education after just a year
or two in existence. A rough idea of its effects
could then be gleaned by looking at the stan-
dard NAEP mathematics and reading results
(a data set that is separate from the Long-
Term Trends report mentioned earlier). The
news wouldn’t be good: As depicted in
Figures 1 and 2, the trends in those results
are virtually unchanged. 
While both 4th- and 8th-grade math scores
rose between 2003 and 2005 (the only period
during which score changes can be reasonably
attributed to NCLB), the rate of improvement
actually slowed from that achieved between
2000 and 2003, a period before the law’s effects
would have been felt. In reading, the results
were worse, with the period covered by NCLB
seeing a score decline for 8th graders and stag-
nation for 4th graders, following an apprecia-
ble improvement between 2000 and 2002
(before the law’s passage).
The analysis above is admittedly cursory,
providing only tentative evidence of NCLB’s
effects. In June 2006 Harvard University’s Civil
Rights Project released a more rigorous review
of NAEP score trends before and after passage
of NCLB.8 After comparing the trends from
1990 all the way through 2005, the study’s
author, Jaekyung Lee, concluded that
• NCLB does not appear to have had a sig-
nificant impact on improving reading or
math achievement. Average achievement
remains flat in reading and grows at the
same pace in math as it did before NCLB
was passed. In grade 4 math, there was a
temporary improvement right after
NCLB, but it was followed by a return to
the prereform growth rate.
• NCLB does not seem to have helped the
nation and states significantly narrow the
achievement gap. The racial and socioeco-
nomic achievement gap in NAEP reading
and math persists after NCLB. Despite
some improvement in reducing the gap in
math right after NCLB, the progress was
not sustained.
• NCLB’s attempt to scale up the alleged
success of states that already had test-
driven accountability programs9 does
not appear to have worked. It neither
enhanced the earlier academic improve-
ments seen in some of those states nor
transferred them to other states.
NCLB supporters have responded to the
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Harvard study by ignoring it. At the time of
this writing, the only reference to Lee’s study
on the Department of Education’s website was
its routine entry in the department’s database
of education research papers (the ERIC data-
base). And although the Aspen commission
lists the Harvard study in its bibliography, the
commission’s report does not address—indeed,
does not even mention—Jaekyung Lee’s find-
ings.
Interestingly, the Aspen commission re-
leased a background paper of its own investi-
gating post-NCLB test score gaps in seven
states.10 The paper did not compare score
trends before and after the law’s passage and
was not nationally representative, so it is less
useful than the Harvard study, but it is
notable in that it offers little support for the
commission’s own positive views on the
effects of NCLB. The paper finds that post-
NCLB changes in ethnic and other achieve-
ment gaps have been “mixed.” Some gaps
have shrunk, some have grown larger, others
haven’t changed much at all.
Another recent report that bears on
NCLB’s academic effects was conducted by
the Northwest Evaluation Association, a non-
profit test provider that works with 2,400
school districts. Using its database of test
scores from more than 300,000 students,
NWEA researchers compared how much stu-
dents learned over the course of the 2003–04
school year with how much they learned in
2001–02. What the researchers found was that
students learned less in a year after NCLB’s
passage than they did before it, a result that
held true for every ethnic group analyzed and
for both mathematics and reading.11
The NWEA’s results, it should be noted,
were not necessarily nationally representa-
tive—data from only 23 states were used—and
they do not conclusively prove that NCLB
was responsible for the observed decline in
student learning. However, they are a further
piece of evidence that NCLB has not im-
proved American education. Those results
have also largely been ignored by the people
who wish to reauthorize the law.
There is one last, important component
to NCLB that might offer evidence that the
law is working: NCLB requires all states to
create math and reading standards and to
test student mastery of them. Perhaps the
results of those assessments are promising.
Indeed, many states have been reporting
gains on state test scores. Most recently, a June
2007 report from the Center on Education
Policy found that many states have seen over-
all state test score improvements and shrink-
ing achievement gaps under NCLB, a finding
that Secretary Spellings declared “confirms
that No Child Left Behind has struck a chord
of success with our nation’s schools and stu-
dents. . . . We know that the law is working.”12
Despite the seemingly rosy findings when
it comes to state test results, there is more
bad news than good. For one thing, the CEP
study identified huge holes and inconsisten-
cies in state data, the result of most states’
having altered their standards, tests, defini-
tions of “proficiency,” and other achievement
measures since NCLB was passed. Indeed,
there were so many holes in the data that
CEP had usable pre- and post-NCLB data for
only 13 states, and only enough information
to conduct full analyses for 7.
And data holes are not the only problem.
Several studies have found that students’ scores
on state tests often greatly outstrip their perfor-
mance on NAEP exams, suggesting that states
make success on their own tests relatively easy
to achieve compared with the more rigorous
NAEP. A June 2006 University of California,
Berkeley, analysis comparing scores on state
tests with those on NAEP for 12 states, for
instance, concluded that “state results consis-
tently exaggerate the percentage of fourth-
graders deemed proficient or above in reading
and math—for any given year and for reported
rates of annual progress, compared with NAEP
results.”13 More recently, the Institute of
Education Sciences equated scores on state
tests in schools that administered NAEP with
those schools’ NAEP results. (NAEP is based on
representative sampling of schools and stu-
dents rather than testing every student in every
school.) This revealed that most states’ “profi-
cient” levels are equivalent to NAEP’s “basic”
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designation. That is, except in 4th-grade read-
ing, where most state proficiency levels are actu-
ally below NAEP’s basic level.14
Taking all these findings together, NCLB
appears to have done little good, despite
rhetoric from NCLB supporters to the con-
trary. Indeed, if anything, there is appreciable
evidence that NCLB may have slowed or even
partly reversed gains achieved before its pas-
sage.
Understanding the Law’s
Politics and Unintended
Consequences
Despite promises from supporters that
NCLB would be fundamentally different
from previous federal education policies—
focusing on academic outcomes rather than
inputs like money, school buildings, or
improved technology—it shares a critical fea-
ture with its predecessors: its ultimate design
was driven chiefly by political rather than
educational goals, dooming it to failure. 
The first problem that politics created is
that NCLB had to be a product of compro-
mise between disparate interest groups and
ideological preferences, rendering it politically
palatable but logically incoherent. Consider
the forces at work during its creation. Among
Republicans, there was significant resistance
to federal involvement in education, resulting
in a law that at the federal level promised “pro-
ficiency” but left states to set their own stan-
dards and proficiency definitions. For their
part, Democrats have very strong connections
to teachers’ unions and school administrators,
who often oppose rigorous standards, and
civil rights groups, who have traditionally
feared that such standards would be used to
punish districts with large minority popula-
tions. Democrats have also, though, tradition-
ally supported a significant federal role in edu-
cation funding. This collision of competing
goals helped mold NCLB into a law that has
lavished significant new federal funding on
public schools while imposing hollow stan-
dards and accountability.
The second problem is that, because pub-
lic schools are politically controlled, the sys-
tem is inevitably geared first and foremost to
helping politicians and special interests like
teachers and administrators, not parents and
students. So while NCLB’s supposed goal is
to force public schools to establish and meet
high standards, it actually encourages states
to keep standards as low as possible while
providing the veneer of tough accountability.
State policymakers, abetted by federal offi-
cials who respond to special interests, have
been unable to resist this opening, often set-
ting standards as low as they can, defining
proficiency as loosely as possible, and admin-
istering easy tests, thereby avoiding the law’s
penalties to the greatest extent possible while
still claiming success. Consider a few specific
examples:
• After finding that many students strug-
gled with a new 3rd-grade reading test, in
the 2002–03 school year, Texas decreased
the number of questions students need-
ed to answer correctly to pass the test
from 24 out of 36 to 20.15
• When 1,513 of its schools showed up on
the first NCLB list of schools needing
improvement, Michigan lowered the
percentage of students that needed to
pass state exams to make “adequate
yearly progress,” including dropping the
percentage needed to pass high school
English from 75 percent to 42 percent.16
• Soon after NCLB was passed, Colorado
redesignated scores that had been called
“partially proficient” on state exams as
“proficient.”17
• Perhaps gambling that NCLB would be
a dead letter before 2014, Ohio back-
loaded its adequate yearly progress
goals, aiming to increase proficiency by
just 3.3 percent per year for the law’s
first six years but then by 40 percent in
its last six years.
• In Louisiana students who scored at the
“basic” level on state tests were designat-
ed “proficient” for NCLB purposes.18
• In 2005 Wisconsin cut the number of its
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schools that failed to meet NCLB stan-
dards by more than half by implement-
ing a 99 percent confidence interval to
judge schools’ test results.19
Those are not isolated incidents. Nation-
wide, NCLB’s perverse incentives have set off
what Thomas B. Fordham Foundation presi-
dent Chester Finn has dubbed a “race to the
bottom.”20 In October 2005, when the NAEP
reading and math exam results were released,
a Fordham analysis found that almost 20
states had reported gains in the percentage of
8th graders rated “proficient” on their own
tests between 2003 and 2005, but none had
made any progress on the NAEP. Many states
either had set very low bars for “proficiency” or
had used some other tricks to remain in good
standing under NCLB. The 2007 IES report
comparing NAEP and state test scores seems
to confirm this.
Perhaps most disturbing, in 2006 the
Associated Press revealed that nearly two mil-
lion minority students weren’t having their
scores counted separately by group, as NCLB
requires, because states were setting very high
minimum subgroup sizes. Oklahoma, for
instance, was allowing schools to exclude the
scores of any group with fewer than 52 mem-
bers, whereas Maryland set the exempt group
size at only 5.21
The third major problem caused by NCLB
is a classic case of unintended consequences
stemming from government action: marginal-
ization of academic subjects not covered by
the law’s standards and testing requirements.
According to a nationally representative 2006
survey of school districts conducted by the
Center on Education Policy, to focus on read-
ing and math 71 percent of districts have
reduced the amount of time elementary
schools spend on other subjects.22
Perhaps the hardest-hit subject has been
social studies. In testimony before the Senate
Subcommittee on Education and Early
Childhood Development, historian David
McCullough observed that “because of No
Child Left Behind, sadly, history is being put
on the back burner or taken off the stove alto-
gether in many or most schools, in favor of
math or reading.”23 Similarly, Princeton
University historian Theodore Rabb has
lamented that “the unintended consequence
of No Child Left Behind has been to put his-
tory into an even more marginal position. . . .
With some notable exceptions . . . the amount
of class time given to history, especially in the
first eight grades, has been shrinking almost
by the month.”24
To address those concerns, many teachers
and experts in subjects other than math and
reading have recommended adding their own
disciplines to NCLB’s list of subjects for which
schools will be held accountable. In March
2007, for instance, the Working Group of
Social Studies Discipline Organizations
released a statement calling for adding “the
core social studies disciplines—civics/govern-
ment, economics, geography, and history” to
the list of subjects for which NCLB mandates
state standards and testing.25 Similarly, in
February 2007, fitness guru Richard Simmons
joined Reps. Zach Wamp (R-TN) and Ron
Kind (D-WI) in a press conference to unveil
the Strengthening Physical Education Act of
2007, which would add physical education to
the roster of subjects with federally mandated
minimum standards and assessments.26
Of course, in trying to emphasize every-
thing, NCLB would in fact emphasize noth-
ing. Moreover, even if it were somehow possi-
ble to expand NCLB’s focus across the entire
curriculum (by, say, adding several hours to
the school day), there is no empirical reason
to think it would do any good. As discussed
earlier, NCLB has not improved overall
achievement or diminished gaps even when
concentrated on just two subjects. 
Evaluating Proposed
Modifications to NCLB
In August 2006 Secretary Spellings com-
pared NCLB to Ivory soap: “It’s 99.9 percent
pure or something. . . . There’s not much
needed in the way of change.”27 Given that
there is still no conclusive evidence that
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NCLB is working, and that there is good rea-
son to believe that it is producing harmful
unintended consequences, this is not a com-
mon view. Even most NCLB supporters have
called for the law to be reformed in various
ways.
Unfortunately, it is fair to say that, overall,
recommendations for reform have generally
taken a “more of the same” approach: more
funding, more centralization, and more stan-
dards and testing. Consider, for example, sev-
eral of the recommendations offered by the
Aspen Institute in Beyond NCLB: Fulfilling the
Promise to Our Nation’s Children:
• Implement new requirements that prin-
cipals qualify as highly effective princi-
pals (HEP), a designation that would
carry licensure requirements, demonstra-
tion of “the necessary skills for effectively
leading a school,” and production of
“improvements in student achievement
that are comparable to high-achieving
schools made up of student populations
with similar challenges.”28
• Add science to the list of subjects on
which students must make adequate
yearly progress.29
• Make public education address “students’
behavioral and social needs by requiring
schools to determine the availability of
social services and mental health services
when developing the school’s improve-
ment plan.”30
• Require states to add a 12th-grade
assessment to their testing regime.31
• Create federal “model content and per-
formance standards and tests” in read-
ing, math, and science and allow states
to either adopt those standards and
tests or have the federal government
compare state standards and tests with
the national model.32
To begin with, those requirements would
add yet more stultifying rules and regula-
tions to NCLB. That, however, is not their
biggest fault. More important, none of those
provisions would address a key problem with
government-imposed education standards:
evasion. The same authorities who have been
keeping standards low and results “good”
under NCLB would have power under the
Aspen commission’s proposals. There is no
reason to think they would be any less likely
to game the system under Aspen’s proposals
than under the current arrangement.
Consider nationalization of standards and
tests. Intended to halt the race to the bottom
by setting a single standard for every school in
the country, federal standards would instead
just relocate to Washington the political eva-
sion game currently being played by states.
Indeed, even if rigorous national education
standards could initially survive the political
process and be included in a revised NCLB,
they would likely be crippled during the writ-
ing of regulations to implement the law, in
which special interests have an even greater
influence than they do in the legislative
process. The work of writing regulations is
done in the backrooms of the federal bureauc-
racy, not with the public scrutiny that often
accompanies work on legislation, and inter-
ests like the National Education Association,
which alone has a staff of more than 500 in
Washington, are much better able to partici-
pate in such things as “negotiated rule mak-
ing” than are parents.
Evasion would come from both the top
and the bottom of the political food chain. At
the top, an administration that championed
the law would be encouraged by political expe-
diency to produce favorable-looking test re-
sults to bolster its chances for reelection if in
its first term, or to help its party—and the pres-
ident’s legacy—if in its second. Witness Sec-
retary Spellings’s pronouncements that NCLB
is a proven success despite significant evidence
to the contrary. At the bottom, interest groups
like the National Education Association,
National School Boards Association, and
numerous others whose members might be
embarrassed or harmed by higher standards
would have a powerful incentive to lobby for
lower ones. And regulatory bodies often come
under the sway of the very groups they are sup-
posed to regulate because those are the groups
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whose livings come from the status quo and
are therefore the most active in lobbying, par-
ticipating in such regulation-drafting activi-
ties as negotiated rule making and advocacy
communications. As a result, the pressure on
the bureaucracy to lower standards to present
a favorable picture of student achievement
would be just as intense at the national level as
it has been at the state.
Unfortunately, the Aspen commission is
not the only group on the national standards
bandwagon. In January 2007 Sen. Chris Dodd
(D-CT) introduced the Standards to Provide
Educational Achievement for All Kids Act,
cosponsored in the House by Rep. Vernon
Ehlers (R-MI). The act would have the National
Assessment Governing Board—which current-
ly oversees the politically toothless NAEP
tests—create national K–12 math and science
standards and would bribe states to use those
standards by establishing an American Stand-
ards Incentive Fund to pass out grants to states
that adopted them. 
State adoption of the standards is touted
as “voluntary” by the act’s supporters, but this
claim rests on a fallacious equivocation: advo-
cates seldom say for whom the standards would
be voluntary. They would certainly not be vol-
untary for families. If a state opted in, as every
state has opted in to NCLB thus far, families
who did not agree with the law could not opt
out. They would have no choice in the matter.
For states and school districts, too, nation-
al standards would not be truly voluntary.
Dodd’s incentive fund would, after all, be
stocked with money taken involuntarily from
taxpayers, and the federal government would
return it only to states that “volunteered” to
abide by the federal standards. That is more
akin to extortion than voluntary exchange.
Of course, real voluntarism would defeat
the stated purpose of national standards,
which advocates argue are needed to halt
NCLB’s race to the bottom. If states could
truly opt in and out of such programs with-
out penalty, then the sought-after uniformi-
ty in standards would not likely arise. 
The reality is that no matter how national
standards were imposed, there would be noth-
ing to prevent federal policymakers from play-
ing politics with them, quietly dumbing them
down just as states and local districts have done
with their standards. Consider the national
standards plan favored by the Thomas B.
Fordham Foundation. It would vest standards-
setting responsibility in an independent federal
entity like NAGB, reasoning that doing so
would greatly insulate the standards from
political interference. NAGB, Fordham argues,
“is a broadly representative and bipartisan
body, with all key stakeholders present,” and “it
has not been timid about demonstrating its
independence both of political masters and of
education interest groups.”33
Of course, the NAEP—which NAGB over-
sees—has never had any real consequences
(read: money) attached to its results, making it
a very low-payoff target for special interests. In
spite of that, Fordham president Chester Finn
has himself told Congress that NAGB and
other supposedly neutral federal education
functions are in constant political peril. As he
testified before the House Subcommittee on
Early Childhood, Youth and Families in 2000:
Unfortunately, the past decade has also
shown how vulnerable these activities
are to all manner of interference, manip-
ulation, political agendas, incompetence
and simple mischief. It turns out that
they are nowhere near to being ade-
quately immunized against Washing-
ton’s three great plagues:
• the pressing political agendas and
evanescent policy passions of elect-
ed officials (in both executive and
legislative branches) and their ap-
pointees and aides,
• the depredations and incursions
of self-serving interest groups and
lobbyists (of which no field has
more than education), and
• plain old bureaucratic bungling
and incompetence.34
So even when no money has been attached to
success on federal standards, according to
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Finn, NAGB has been under constant politi-
cal assault.
Another popular reform proposal is to
add “flexibility” to NCLB—generally allowing
schools and districts to more easily avoid the
law’s sanctions—while significantly increas-
ing funding. A group of current and former
school administrators called Public Schools
for Tomorrow, for instance, recently called
for much less standardized testing, as well as
rewards for schools that make substantial
progress (rather than sanctions for those that
do poorly).35 They also, though, said that
Washington should pony up money for a
program to train new teachers and should
fund NCLB at the full level authorized by the
law. Congress, however, rarely appropriates
the fully authorized amounts under any law.
Only two NCLB proposals break with the
“more federal government” model. Instead of
increasing the federal role in education, the
Academic Partnerships Lead Us to Success Act
of 2007 (A-PLUS) would allow states to declare
that they want to run their own education sys-
tems and get money back from Washington if
they do so.36 The Local Education Authority
Returns Now Act (LEARN) would go one bet-
ter, through a tax credit giving federal money
directly back to individual taxpayers in states
that declare their independence.37
There are two versions of A-PLUS, with the
Senate version requiring that states enter into
performance agreements with Washington in
exchange for their freedom and money. The
House version requires no such agreement.38
The latter approach and LEARN are especially
welcome because they would take federal poli-
tics out of setting performance standards.
Only LEARN, though, makes whole the tax-
payers from whom federal education money
was taken in the first place. Still, all three are
superior to other alternatives because they rec-
ognize that states are closer to their people,
states are better equipped to handle education
than the feds, and states that wish to run their
own education systems should not have to
sacrifice money taken from their taxpayers. 
As preferable as those bills are to competing
reauthorization proposals, neither is a com-
plete solution to the federal education problem.
While they decrease the compulsion and intru-
siveness of current federal education policy, nei-
ther complies fully with the Constitution or
eradicates the ability of federal policymakers to
politicize educational decisions. 
The Federal Government’s
Proper Role in Education
Perhaps because the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act (of which NCLB is
just the latest version) has existed since 1965,
the federal presence in our schools has come
to be taken for granted and its constitutional-
ity no longer seriously questioned. But when it
comes to education policy, the Constitution
has not been amended since its adoption in
1789, and neither the word “education” nor
the word “schooling” appears among the enu-
merated powers that it grants to the federal
government. Washington thus has no legiti-
mate role in education other than complying
with the Fourteenth Amendment by prohibit-
ing state and local discrimination in the provi-
sion of schooling. As the Tenth Amendment
makes clear, “The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.”
So how did the federal government get
involved in the first place? For most of the
nation’s history, education was a state, local,
and family affair, in keeping with the Tenth
Amendment. The federal government’s first
major forays into education were special-pur-
pose laws: the GI Bill of 1944, subsidizing col-
lege for World War II veterans, and the
National Defense Education Act of 1958,
aimed at beefing up science instruction in the
wake of Russia’s launch of the satellite
Sputnik. So anathema was the idea of federal
education involvement, in fact, that even the
administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt
—not known for a conservative conception of
federal power—did not see a constitutional
role for the federal government in education,
as this excerpt from a 1941 federal govern-
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ment publication, History of the Formation of the
Union under the Constitution, illustrates:
Q. Where, in the Constitution, is there
mention of education?
A. There is none; education is a matter
reserved for the states.39
Because of the longstanding respect for
local control and the Constitution, it was not
until 1965, with the ESEA, that Congress
stepped squarely into the general education
business. Slowly but surely, it has increased
that presence ever since.
The effects of Congress’s extraconstitu-
tional venture into education have been broad
and damaging. Among other harms, ignoring
the Constitution has undermined the rule of
law, because the Constitution establishes the
proper scope of federal power. Bounds on fed-
eral power have been eliminated and there is
little Washington won’t prescribe, right down
to how schools teach reading, rendering the
Constitution a dead letter. In addition, the
nationalization of education has created a
sprawling impersonal bureaucracy in a field
that demands, by its very nature, considerable
individualization and personal attention.
The Framers would probably have predict-
ed exactly such outcomes from federal educa-
tion involvement. They knew that a huge but
distant national government could not be
truly responsive to the unique needs of local
communities and individual families. They
also knew that centralized government could
easily decay into exploitation, with those
wielding government power almost certain to
use it for their own good rather than that of
the people they nominally serve. That is why
they ceded only a few specific powers to the
national government—powers that had to be
wielded centrally—and otherwise reserved
authority to the states or the people. 
In Federalist no. 46, James Madison makes
clear the advantages of state rather than
national control: “By the superintending care
of these [States], all the more domestic and
personal interests of the people will be regu-
lated and provided for. With the affairs of
these, the people will be more familiarly and
minutely conversant. And with the members
of these, will a greater proportion of the peo-
ple have the ties of personal acquaintance
and friendship, and of family and party
attachments.”40
For most of American history, education
was highly decentralized—to a large extent
even privatized—and was very successful. For
instance, by the time the Constitution was
drafted, literacy among free American males
was around 65 percent, significantly higher
than in Europe.41 By 1840 it was estimated
that nearly 90 percent of white males were lit-
erate.42 And keep in mind that those literacy
rates were achieved in a population that was
busy taming a still-wild land.
Contrast this to America’s education track
record since 1965, when the ESEA was passed.
On the NAEP long-term reading assessment,
9-year-olds saw their scores rise only 11 points
between 1971 and 2004 (on a 500-point scale);
13-year-olds saw only a 4-point gain; and 17-
year-olds—the “final products” of our K–12
system—saw no gain at all: the average score
was 285 in 1971 and 285 in 2004.
In math the results were a little better, but
not much: 9-year-olds’ scores increased 22
points, from 219 to 241, and 13-year-olds’ had
a 15-point uptick. However, 17-year-olds saw
only a 3-point nudge, from 304 to 307. The
implication is that learning has shifted some-
what toward the lower grades, but that, at the
end of high school, students are not signifi-
cantly better prepared academically than they
were more than three decades ago. And the
poor—whom many programs are supposed to
target—have not benefited any more than the
general population. Using parents’ highest
level of education as a proxy for wealth (no
income or other wealth breakdown is available
through the NAEP), math scores for 17-year-
olds whose parents have less than a high
school education rose only 7 points between
1978 and 2004, and reading scores dropped by
3 points.43 This despite a substantial rise in the
standard of living, the advent of personal com-
puters and the Internet, and a more than dou-
bling of real per pupil spending between the
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1970–71 and 2002–03 school years (from
$5,064 to $10,464).44 We have suffered, in
other words, a catastrophic decline in educa-
tional productivity, analogous to buying
1970s cars today and paying twice their origi-
nal selling price.
The federal government has been a major
contributor to this colossal inefficiency,
spending a combined total of more than
$452 billion, after inflation, on ESEA pro-
grams between 1966 and 2006.45 In almost
that exact same time frame—1965 to 2005—
real federal spending per elementary and sec-
ondary pupil grew 545 percent, from $193 to
$1,242.46 Despite this massive investment,
and the ever-increasing federal control that
accompanied it, scores on the NAEP long-
term trend exams have been essentially stag-
nant, especially among high school seniors.
The federal government has spent hun-
dreds of billions of dollars on elementary and
secondary education since ESEA was passed
but has almost nothing to show in return. This
track record points clearly to the wisdom of the
Constitution’s Framers, who deliberately chose
not to accord Congress a role in education pol-
icymaking because they were convinced that
such a role would prove disastrous.
The Education Market
Alternative
Given NCLB’s inability to live up to the
expectations set for it and the poor showing
of federal education interventions more gen-
erally, it is well past time to refocus our
nation’s energies on more effective structural
reforms. There is now a vast international lit-
erature comparing the relative merits of dif-
ferent school governance and funding sys-
tems. Of particular interest is the research
that compares parent-chosen private schools
with bureaucratic state-run education sys-
tems, after controlling for student back-
ground characteristics and other nonschool
factors thought to influence outcomes.
Figure 3 distills the results of that research,
showing the number of separate statistically
significant findings of differences in out-
comes between the sectors.
The studies providing the source data for
this figure were identified by a combination of
academic database searches, Google Internet
searches, and consultation of the references
listed in the studies found through those
searches. The initial searches were conducted
as part of a literature review first published in
2004 and updated for this paper.47
The six different outcome categories48 for
which empirical evidence is available are stu-
dent academic achievement (as measured by
test scores), school efficiency (as measured by
achievement per dollar spent), parental satis-
faction, the orderliness of the classroom envi-
ronment, the condition in which physical
facilities are maintained, and the earnings of
graduates.49
As can be gleaned from Figure 3, there are
35 statistically significant findings of a pri-
vate-sector advantage in academic achieve-
ment, and only 5 of a government-sector
advantage. The breakdown for school efficien-
cy is 23 to 3. For the other four outcome cate-
gories, all the statistically significant findings
we located favor private provision.
The advantages of parental choice and
competition do not end at improving overall
outcomes. They have also proven superior in
diminishing racial achievement gaps, a major
stated goal of NCLB. Several studies of U.S.
school voucher programs, for instance, have
found that African-American students bene-
fit the most from participation in such pro-
grams and, hence, suggest that parental
choice could significantly close the racial
achievement gap if expanded to include all
students. Other studies have found that
inner-city Catholic schools have a dispropor-
tionately positive effect on African-American
high school graduation rates, college accep-
tance rates, and college graduation rates and
that universal public and private school
choice programs would greatly reduce resi-
dential segregation.50
Note that Figure 3 understates the benefits
of market provision of education. Most studies
of market versus bureaucratic provision of edu-
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cation simply compare the results between the
sectors. But while market forces operate more
vigorously in the private sector, they can also
affect the performance of government schools
—particularly when government schools face
intense competition from the private sector due
to school choice programs.
For example, to determine the effect that
Chile’s nationwide school voucher program
has had on academic achievement in both
government and private voucher schools,
researcher Francisco Gallego compared their
test scores with the scores of Chile’s elite non-
voucher private schools. These schools opted
not to participate in the nation’s voucher
program when it was introduced in 1982
because the voucher amount was well below
the tuitions that they charged, and the state
mandated at the time that the voucher be
accepted as full payment. So, for reasons of
financial expediency, they chose not to accept
voucher students.
Enrolling the children of many of the
wealthiest, most highly educated families in
Chile, these elite schools not surprisingly
outscore both voucher-funded private schools
and government schools. But the gap in the
scores between these sectors has been narrow-
ing over time under the voucher program, as
Gallego has shown. Figures 4 and 5 chart the
scores of government and private voucher stu-
dents on a national test as a fraction of the
scores achieved by elite nonvoucher private
school students. At both the 4th and 8th grade
levels, voucher students and government
school students have closed the gap substan-
tially. Harvard professor Caroline Minter
Hoxby found a similar positive effect on gov-
ernment school achievement under the much
smaller scale Milwaukee voucher program.51
In light of this evidence, it is clear that the
fundamental idea behind NCLB—improving
achievement through government bench-
marks and penalties for failing to meet
them—is mistaken. In fact, the law is a barri-
er to educational improvement because it
pressures states to focus on central planning
and bureaucratic compliance rather than on
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unleashing market forces, as the scholarly
research suggests should be done.
Conclusion and
Recommendations:
Phase Out NCLB and
Promote School Choice
in the States
Previous policy reports on the future of the
No Child Left Behind Act have rested on the
assumption that the law’s basic principles are
sound, and those reports have thus failed to
critically examine NCLB’s performance or
long-term prospects for success. Worse yet,
they have generally ignored important evi-
dence that contradicts their assumptions. 
The evidence and analysis presented here
make it clear that the federal government has
no proper role in American education
beyond enforcing civil rights laws. Moreover,
neither federal interventions in general nor
NCLB in particular have lived up to the
expectations set out for them. Nor can they,
because federal intrusions actually discour-
age states from pursuing truly effective poli-
cies—those based on parental choice, school
autonomy, and competition.
We therefore recommend that the U.S.
Department of Education be abolished and
that funding for all federal education pro-
grams be turned into temporary block grants
to the states. Those grants should be phased
out completely over three years, giving states
time to reallocate their own personnel and
resources. In addition, so that taxpayers do
not continue to pay for a function Washing-
ton is no longer serving, federal income tax
rates should be reduced in proportion to the
amount of overall federal spending that is cur-
rently allotted to education.
One objection to this proposal might be
that states have often proven little better at
handling education than Washington. How
will devolving power back to them help?
That is a reasonable objection. States have
indeed been consolidating power over educa-
tion at the same time as the federal govern-
ment and have little more to show for it. And
they have failed largely for the same reason as
the federal government: while states are closer
to the families who are being short-changed
by public schooling, state governments are
still huge political institutions dominated by
special interests, and power is still held by
politicians and bureaucrats, not parents. That
is also true in many school districts, which
have become much larger and more central-
ized over the last century. Some districts
encompass entire counties, and large urban
districts often have in excess of 100,000 stu-
dents. New York City has more than a million.
Even “locally,” then, individual parents often
have very little recourse when they are unhap-
py with the schools. That is why the public
must demand that policymakers introduce
universal choice at the state and local level
once federal entanglement is removed.
Several states have already begun to move
down the road to educational freedom
through education tax credit programs (both
for families’ own use and for donations to
scholarship funds that serve low-income
families) and school voucher programs. Thus
far, those programs are still too small to gen-
uinely transform American education. The
NCLB reauthorization debate, however, is an
ideal time to pause, examine the evidence,
and admit that school choice policies—not
more centralization in Washington—are by
far the most promising avenue for realizing
our educational goals and ideals.
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